Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It Both Ways? by Gaertner, Michael J.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 3 Article 6
Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should
Corporation Owners Have It Both Ways?
Michael J. Gaertner
Copyright c 1989 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Michael J. Gaertner, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It Both
Ways?, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 667 (1989), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/6
REVERSE PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: SHOULD
CORPORATION OWNERS HAVE IT BOTH WAYS?
Jurisprudential pragmatism prevents the exaltation of legal-
ities to a sacrosanct status in disregard of realities. Courts do
in fact recognize the truth implicit in the Coca-Cola slogan
"It's the real thing."'
Unfortunately, courts rarely recognize the "real thing" when
confronted with a "reverse pierce" of the corporate veil. A reverse
pierce of the corporate veil refers to an attempt by shareholders, or
the corporation itself, to pierce the corporate veil existing between
the corporation and its shareholders.2 This definition encompasses
all shareholder claims that a court should treat the corporation
and its shareholders as a single, identical being.
The reverse pierce focuses on the relationship between the cor-
poration owner3 and the corporation, typically the parent and sub-
sidiary. Traditional corporate entity doctrine draws a line between
the owner and the corporation. No matter how fuzzy that line be-
comes, the line separating the two entities always exists. The exis-
tence of this indelible line establishes the artificial personality of a
corporation, a personality distincf from its owners, and the founda-
tion of traditional corporate entity doctrine. The reverse pierce
strikes at the heart of this concept. Under the reverse pierce, the
corporation owner and the corporation become one legal entity
when the legal line of demarcation between the entities becomes
virtually nonexistent. This conflict between accepted corporate
theory and the reverse pierce focuses attention on the line-drawing
function of corporate entity theory.
1. Kingston Dev. Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, -, 208 S.E.2d 118, 121-22 (1974).
2. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.70 (rev.
perm. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
3. For the purposes of this Note, a corporation owner is more than a shareholder of a
corporation. At minimum, a corporation owner owns a sufficiently large block of stock to
exert significant control over the corporation. A corporation owner then utilizes this control
to take an active role in managing the corporation. The interests of the corporation and the
corporation owner are coextensive. A corporation owner may be an individual or another
corporation.
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Courts have responded to the reverse pierce in a variety of ways,
yet courts rarely address the substance of the corporation owner's
claim that the corporation owner and the corporation are identical.
The law encompassing the reverse pierce is truly one in which form
prevails over substance. Courts typically dismiss the corporation
owner's plea to reverse pierce by ruling summarily that corporation
owners may not "'have it both ways.' -4
The judicial abhorrence to the reverse pierce is the product of
several deficiencies in corporate law. Courts adhere to traditional
corporate entity theory, under which the shareholder and his cor-
poration are distinct for all purposes. 5 Traditional entity theory,
however, is rooted in archaic notions of the corporate entity that
are no longer relevant. Unlike the first business corporations of six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century England,6 enormous corporate en-
terprises consisting of multiple subsidiaries operating on a global
scale dominate the modern corporate landscape. Corporate entity
theory has failed to evolve at the same pace as the corporation.
The confusion surrounding the conventional veil-piercing doc-
trine 7 also contributes to the courts' reluctance to reverse pierce. A
number of corporate veil-piercing theories exist, but no single test
prevails. In fact, courts may apply more than one test within the
same jurisdiction.' In the face of the resulting confusion, the judi-
cial reluctance to reverse pierce is not surprising.
4. See, e.g., In re Beck Indus., 479 F.2d 410, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858
(1973).
5. E.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. Wheeler, 419 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (quoting
Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1972)) ("[I]t is
axiomatic that a corporation is a 'creature of the law, endowed with a personality separate
and distinct from that of its owners'... ."); see Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The
Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 563 (1987) (Corporate personality doc-
trine "is one of the most enduring institutions of the law and one of the most widely ac-
cepted legal fictions.").
6. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
7. Conventional veil-piercing doctrine refers to the law governing a third party's attempt
to pierce the veil separating a corporation's assets from that of its owners. See generally P.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER COMMON LAW
PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 6.01, at 105-
06 (1987); 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 41 (discussion of conventional veil-piercing
theory).
8. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:667
REVERSE PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
The courts' absolute refusal to examine the economic realities in
a particular case underlies the opposition to the reverse pierce. By
refusing to look beneath the surface of the corporation/shareholder
form, courts avoid addressing the substance of the corporation/
shareholder relationship. Praise of the judiciary's ability to avoid
"the exaltation of legalities to a sacrosanct status in disregard of
realities"9 is undeserved when it comes to the reverse pierce. In-
stead, appreciation of the economic reality of a particular case is
the foundation of the reverse pierce.
This Note asserts that modern economic realities mandate judi-
cial acceptance of the reverse pierce. The Note first traces the his-
tory of the corporation, examining the divergence of traditional
concepts of the corporate entity from modern reality. Next, the
Note briefly surveys traditional veil-piercing theory and highlights
the confused state of the law. Third, the Note reviews existing re-
verse pierce case law in the context of the various approaches. Fi-
nally, the Note criticizes the current approaches to the reverse
pierce and proposes that courts adopt a "unitary interest" test.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
A. History of the Corporation
The modern private business corporation has been in existence
for approximately two centuries. 10 In England, the first substantial
business corporations were the "quasi-governmental foreign trad-
ing companies" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." The
Crown or the Parliament, by special act, granted charters of incor-
poration to the trading companies to explore, colonize, and trade
in the New World.12 The trading companies were not regarded as
organizations created simply to operate a business but rather "as
public agencies, to which had been confided the duty of regulating
foreign trade."'
Unincorporated joint stock companies followed the trading com-
panies in the evolutionary chain of the modern corporation. Ap-
9. Kingston Dev. Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, _, 208 S.E.2d 118, 121-22 (1974).
10. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 1, at 2.
11. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 8, at 31 (rev. ed. 1946).
12. Id.
13. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 1, at 3.
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pearing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,14 the joint
stock company, although not incorporated, issued transferrable
shares. 15 The joint stock company was the predecessor of the mod-
ern corporation.' 6
In post-Revolutionary War America, state legislatures initially
followed the English method of chartering corporations. Private
legislative acts created a particular corporation. 17 As with the Eng-
lish trading companies, "the corporate privilege was granted spar-
ingly; and only when the grant seemed necessary in order to pro-
cure for the community some specific benefit otherwise
unattainable."" s Creation of a corporation by private legislative
act, however, rapidly became impractical. In 1811, New York en-
acted the first general incorporation law opening certain manufac-
turing industries to all applicants."9 General incorporation laws be-
came commonplace by the middle of the nineteenth century.20
Despite the rapid acceptance of general incorporation laws, a
widespread distrust toward private corporations pervaded the
American culture throughout the nineteenth century. The public
perceived private corporations as posing "some insidious men-
ace." 21 Justice Brandeis described the popular belief:
[I]ncorporation for business was commonly denied long after it
had been freely granted for religious, educational and charitable
purposes. It was denied because of fear. Fear of encroachment
upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual. Fear of
the subjection of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that
the absorption of capital by corporations, and their perpetual
life, might bring evils similar to those which attended
mortmain."
14. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 8, at 33.
15. Id.
16. Id. Contra 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 1, at 3. ("It was not ... until the middle of
the seventeenth century that there came into existence the great trading corporations of
England, which of all ancient forms come nearest to approximating the commercial giants of
modern times.").
17. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 9, at 37.
18. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 9, at 37 & n.18.
20. Id. at 37-38.
21. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted).
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The popular distrust of corporations encouraged legislative re-
strictions on the creation of corporations. Typical restrictions in-
cluded limitations on the amount of authorized capital, the extent
of the corporation's powers, and the scope of a corporation's activ-
ity.23 The various state legislatures did not remove the severe re-
strictions on the size and scope of the business corporations until
the early part of this century.24
Ironically, the widespread repeal of the restrictions resulted from
a "race to the bottom" among the states. As certain states removed
the restrictions, others followed suit to prevent the migration of
corporations out of their state.25 The eventual removal of size and
power restrictions thus represented a pragmatic decision, not a
change in popular opinion.
The crucial point in the evolution of the American corporation
occurred in 1888 when New Jersey empowered a corporation to
hold stock in another corporation.28 Other states adopted similar
laws shortly thereafter.2 7 This step marked the birth of the modern
corporation, a multilayered corporate structure. Consequently, in
23. See generally id. at 550-56 (an overview of limitations placed on nineteenth-century
corporations).
24. Id. at 550-64.
25. Id. at 557-60. Justice Brandeis described the downfall of the restrictions imposed on
business corporations:
The removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon the size
and powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their
conviction that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to
the conviction that it was futile to insist upon them; because local restriction
would be circumvented by foreign incorporation. Indeed, local restriction
seemed worse than futile. Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the
traffic in charters, had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws.
Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states
where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in
advertising their wares. The race was not one of diligence but of laxity. Incor-
poration under such laws was possible; and the great industrial States yielded
in order not to lose wholly the prospect of the revenue and the control incident
to domestic incorporation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 9, at 39 & n.25; see generally A. CHANDLER,
STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 30-31
(1962) (prior to 1889, no state explicitly allowed a corporation to hold stock of other
corporations).
27. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 9, at 39.
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the development of the American corporation "a corporation no
longer always represented the entire enterprise."2
B. The Modern Corporate Enterprise
The modern corporate enterprise assumes many forms. On the
one hand, entrepreneurs often form "one man" corporations, or
corporations with a handful of shareholders, to obtain the per-
ceived benefits of the corporate form. On the other hand, modern
conglomerates constantly devour attractive companies as a means
of increasing their already formidable business empires. Interest-
ingly, although these entities are quite dissimilar, the law views
them as equals governed by identical rules. This Note analyzes the
reverse pierce in the context of the modern, multilayered
corporation.29
Modern complex corporations 0 dominate the world economy.
These corporations possess millions of shareholders and encompass
numerous subsidiaries and affiliates. Studies conducted in 1982 ex-
amined the number of subsidiaries owned by the larger American
industrial, retailing, and diversified service corporations.3 " The 120
corporations studied had a total of 5,894 subsidiaries, or an average
of approximately fifty subsidiaries each.2 Mobil Oil alone had 525
subsidiaries. 3 The significance of these numbers increases dramat-
28. P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1.01.1, at 3 (1983).
29. Although this Note deals with the reverse pierce as applied to the members of a cor-
porate group, the arguments advanced apply equally to a close corporation. The reverse
pierce focuses on the shared interests of the corporation and its owner. Undoubtedly, a close
corporation and its shareholders share a unity of interests.
When there is one or a few shareholders, practically speaking, the shareholder-
owners control and direct the affairs of the corporation for their own personal
interests by controlling shareholder meetings and acting as directors and of-
ficers of the corporation. Hence, a unity of interest usually will exist between
the closely held corporation and its shareholder-owners.
Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 378 (1981); see A. BERLE &
G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5-6 (rev. ed. 1967).
30. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, § 1.01.1, at 3. Professor Blumberg defines a complex
corporation as "a group of companies collectively constituting the enterprise." Id.
31. Id. app. 464-70.
32. Id. Indeed, this total is a "conservative" figure as Professor Blumberg excluded "sub-
sidiaries whose size in relation to the enterprise [was] ...of minor significance." Id. app.
464.
33. Id. app. 465.
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ically when one considers that "[m]ost multi-unit corporate enter-
prises involve interrelated businesses. ' 4
The corporate parent creates its family of subsidiaries and affili-
ates for a number of reasons. Among the primary motivations are:
[t]he increased facility in financing; the desire to escape the dif-
ficulty, if not the impossibility, of qualifying the parent com-
pany as a foreign corporation in a particular state; the avoidance
of complications involved in the purchase of physical assets; the
retention of the good will of an established business unit; the
avoidance of taxation; the avoidance of cumbersome manage-
ment structures; [and] the desire for limited liability .... 35
In the final analysis, however, corporation owners clearly choose
the corporate form because it is the most economically rational
business structure under the circumstances.
Professor Landers maintains that economically rational investors
will structure an enterprise into several constituent corporations
when such a structure will maximize the return on their invest-
ment.3 6 The investor's dominant motivation will always be to max-
imize the return on the enterprise as a whole.3 7 As such, the con-
stituent parts concern the enterprise owners38 only to the extent
that they contribute to the profitability of the entire organiza-
tion.39 Even diversification, a major reason behind the operation of
34. Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 527, 532 (1976) (footnote omitted). According to Professor Landers, the reason
that corporate groups generally restrict their operations to one area of business "is obvious:
separate corporate units are usually formed either to further a business need of the investor
or to capitalize on the skills developed in one line of activity." Id.
35. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929); see also H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 135, at 309 (uses and
functions of subsidiary and affiliated corporations); Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect
of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1577, 1583-85 (1971) (factors
encouraging holding company structure).
36. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 589, 591-92 (1975).
37. Id. at 591.
38. "The terms 'enterprise' or 'business enterprise' refer to the combination of parent,
subsidiary, and affiliated companies. The ultimate owners of the enterprise-be they stock-
holders of the parent or of the affiliates-are called 'enterprise owners.'" Id. at 590.
39. Id. at 591. "In fact, since corporate or tax advantages may be obtained by operating
one company at a loss or at the break-even point, the return on investment for the enter-
prise may even be increased by artificially depressing the profits of a constituent corpora-
tion." Id. Contra Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L.
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multiple businesses under an extended corporate umbrella, maxi-
mizes the long-term profitability of the enterprise by stabilizing its
profits during shifts in demand.
The economic interdependence of enterprise members requires
the corporate executives to manage the members of the enterprise
as a single unit.40 Failure to exert sufficient control over the corpo-
rate group members would undoubtedly result in administrative
chaos and a lack of the synergy that corporate strategists expect
from such relationships. Permitting an enterprise member to pur-
sue an independent course of operations would enable that mem-
ber to chart a path adverse to the enterprise as a whole. Such a
result would decrease the return on the entire enterprise and,
therefore, would be economically irrational. The modern corporate
family thus requires a strong parent.
The units of a modern corporate group truly operate as one
"common business enterprise."41 The overwhelming concern with
overall return on the entire enterprise shifts the focus from the
individual group members to the aggregate. Although the group
members typically are individually incorporated, the lines of dis-
tinction between group units no longer remain clear. 42 "The parent
and subsidiary corporations collectively constitute the enterprise,
and the crucial distinction between the enterprise itself and its in-
vestors has disappeared."4
C. Failure of Corporate Entity Theory
The legal concept of corporate personality "is one of the most
enduring institutions of the law and one of the most widely ac-
cepted legal fictions. '44 Yet, the superficial stability of the doctrine
hides a number of grave inadequacies. Despite the preeminence of
the doctrine among established legal theories, most modern law-
REV. 499, 513 (1976) (the group's profits are maximized by maximizing each constituent's
profits).
40. Landers, supra note 36, at 592.
41. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, at xxxi.
42. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, § 1.01.1, at 3-4.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Schane, supra note 5, at 563.
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yers do not understand the substance of the concept.45 In addition,
many of the accepted attributes of corporate personality theory
were fiercely questioned by the legal theorists whose writings later
evolved into the modern doctrine of corporate personality. 6 These
scholars examined a number of deficiencies in the corporate per-
sonality theory that continue to plague modern legal writers.
The central problem facing legal writers who attempt to define
the corporate entity is their preoccupation with devising a univer-
sal and fixed corporate entity theory.47 Professor Latty argued that
both courts and commentators place far too much importance on
the entity concept.48 According to Professor Latty, legal writers
have developed a "fascination [with] the nature of the corporate
entity as the key to problem solution";49 "[o]n the assumption that
corporate entity is the key to the solution, cases have been said to
be inconsistent with each other when in fact they are not, and vice
versa."
50
Despite the universal obsession with definitions of corporate en-
tity, scholars have yet to develop a coherent definition of the cor-
porate entity that reflects the reality of the modern corporate
structure. This deficiency arises not from want of trying; legal
scholars have proposed a multitude of definitions with varying de-
grees of acceptance. 51 In 1926, Justice Cardozo, then an associate
45. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHL
L. REV. 1441, 1441 (1987).
46. For a discussion of the history and development of competing views of corporate per-
sonality, see Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Mark, supra note 45.
47. See Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REV.
597, 599-600 (1936). "One need have no quarrel with use of the term ["entity"] in a proper
context, provided that one looks to it advisedly as merely a loose and convenient summary
of diverse legal phrases and not as the source of the factors of judicial law-making... ." Id.
at 599. See also Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655, 673 (1926) (discussing the problems that occur "when one assumes that there is in
existence some single and coherent theory of personality").
48. Latty, supra note 47, at 627.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 619-20. Professor Latty offered the following synopsis:
[W]e are ... told that the corporation admits of a real personality or at least
of something so like personality that we may call it by that name; that it is a
real person with body, members and will of its own; that it is an artificial per-
son; that it is a real person because what is artificial is real; that even an indi-
1989] 675
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judge on the New York Court of Appeals, recognized that the rela-
tion between members of a corporate group "is one that is .. .
enveloped in the mists of metaphor."52 Ironically, the corporations
existing in 1926, with their more clearly defined organizational
lines, were mere babes compared to the modern conglomerates.
Yet, corporate theory has evolved little since Justice Cardozo's
warning. The failure of corporate law to keep pace with the evolu-
tion of the corporate entity resulted in the obsolescence of the line-
drawing approach.
The corporate theory of artificial personality has long since di-
verged from economic reality.53 The contemporary business enter-
prise is far from the original concept of a corporation,54 yet the law
has failed to adjust to the reality of the modern corporation."5
Courts "blindly adopted" the unyielding concept of separate cor-
porate personality to govern the modern corporate groups.56 Yet,
rigid adherence to archaic notions of corporate entity ignores the
tremendous interdependence among the units of a corporate
group.57 Instead of adapting corporate theory to fit modern reality,
courts manipulated archaic and inflexible notions of separate cor-
porate entity to achieve desired results.5
Furthermore, legal scholars have attacked the established legal
doctrine that a corporation is always an entity separate from its
shareholders. According to Professor Latty:
[P]recedent does not force one to conceive of the corporation as
an entity universally and unqualifiedly separate and distinct
from the stockholders regardless of purpose or problem. Equally
vidual is after all but an artificial legal person, a subject of rights and duties;
that a corporation is not a thing, it is a method; that the entity is a fiction but
a rational fiction, not an arbitrary or artificial fiction; that the "person" is a
fiction but the entity or "thing" is real.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
52. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
53. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, § 1.01.1; Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 343, 344 (1947).
54. Berle, supra note 53, at 344. See generally supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text
(history of corporation).
55. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, § 1.01.2, at 4-6.
56. See id. § 1.01.2, at 5.
57. See generally P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, at xxxi (traditional entity law does not
conform to modem complex corporation).
58. See Berle, supra note 53, at 344.
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consistent with legal precedents is the position that the entity is
both separate and distinct from the stockholders and yet equal
to the aggregation thereof and that for many (in fact, most) pur-
poses no inquiry into the nature and identity of those constitu-
ent parts is essential, for their rights and duties can be deter-
mined collectively. 9
Absolute separation between corporation owner and corporation
does not follow inevitably from the fiction that the corporation is a
separate legal person.60
The quest for the mythical definition of the corporate entity
should be abandoned in favor of a flexible approach. One may
properly define the corporate entity only in light of "the purpose
attempted to be accomplished and the manner of accomplishing
it."' Whether a corporation is a separate legal entity or depends
on the question to be resolved. A corporation may be an entity for
some purposes and not for others.2 The acceptance of this view of
the corporate entity provides a strong foundation for the reverse
pierce.
II. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE VEIL-PIERCING THEORY
Courts generally have contributed little toward developing a co-
herent set of principles to govern corporate veil-piercing theory."
59. Latty, supra note 47, at 615.
60. Id. at 620 (footnote omitted); see also Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARv. L.
REV. 253, 258 (1911). Machen wrote:
[I]n respect to the nature of a corporation, there are two basic propositions, (1)
that a corporation is an entity distinct from the sum of the members that com-
pose it, and (2) that this entity is a person. These propositions are often con-
fused; but they are properly quite distinct from one another.
Id.
61. Douglas & Shanks, supra note 35, at 194. Justice Douglas advocated the position that
a corporation is a "method." When defined as a method, the definition of a corporation
varies from one purpose to another. Id.
62. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TFx L. REV. 979, 1009 (1971). Bryant Smith
reached a similar conclusion over 60 years ago:
It is not the part of legal personality to dictate conclusions. To insist that be-
cause it has been decided that a corporation is a legal person for some pur-
poses . . . is to make . . .corporate personality . . .a master rather than a
servant, and to decide legal questions on irrelevant considerations without in-
quiry into their merits. Issues do not properly turn upon a name.
Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 298 (1928) (footnote omitted).
63. Note, Disregard of the Corporate Entity, 4 WM. MrrcH LL L. REv. 333, 351 (1978).
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The confusion existing in the corporate veil-piercing area is the
product of several factors. Legal writers fail to agree on a single
definition of the corporate entity; a similar lack of consensus
plagues corporate veil-piercing jurisprudence. To compound the
problem, courts make sloppy use of veil-piercing terminology, often
confusing tests: "Devoid of any consistent doctrinal basis, the cases
themselves defy any attempt at rational explanation. '64
No universal test or theory to determine the propriety of pierc-
ing the corporate veil exists. Although one commentator has sug-
gested that the formulation of a universal test is impossible, 65 sev-
eral corporate veil-piercing theories have emerged. The theories
most commonly advanced are agency,6 6 instrumentality,67 iden-
tity6 8 or alter ego,69 and inequitable use of the corporate form.7 0
Unfortunately, such theories have deteriorated to the status of
metaphor against which Justice Cardozo had warned previously.7 1
As a result, the use of such metaphors by the courts has led to
much criticism and is of little practical use.72
Despite the multitude of veil-piercing theories, the approaches
bear a number of similarities. One commentator suggests that, as a
general rule:
the courts have required that the party seeking to pierce the
corporate veil satisfy a two prong test: "(1) that there be such
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities
of the corporation and the individual [shareholders] no longer
64. Landers, supra note 36, at 620.
65. See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALm. L.
REv. 12, 18 (1925).
66. See generally P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, § 6.06 (analysis of agency theory).
67. See generally id. § 6.02 (analysis of the instrumentality doctrine).
68. See generally id. § 6.04 (analysis of the identity doctrine).
69. See generally id. § 6.03 (analysis of the alter ego doctrine).
70. See generally id. § 6.05 (analysis of "sham" or "shell" corporations).
71. See supra text accompanying note 52. "Metaphors in the law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey
v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
72. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, § 6.01, at 107; see also H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, §
136, at 312-13 ("The formulae invoked usually give no guidance or basis for understanding
the results reached. [They] are the magic words or legal incantations with which counsel will
vociferate.").
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exist; and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corpora-
tion alone, an inequitable result will follow. 7 3
This "general rule," along with the various veil-piercing theories on
which it is based, suffers from a number of inadequacies.
When deciding whether a plaintiff has met the jurisdiction's veil-
piercing test, courts often focus on factors irrelevant to the sub-
stance of the plaintiff's claim. The most weighty factor in an analy-
sis often is the observance of corporate formalities. 4 However, the
corporation owner's observance of the details of corporate form
"may have little or no effect on the plaintiff. 7 5 By focusing on
form rather than substance, courts are able to further hidden agen-
das while facially applying the jurisdiction's veil-piercing test.
Courts often advance equitable and public policy concerns by
applying a veil-piercing test. In fact, corporate veil-piercing doc-
trine arguably has evolved into essentially an equitable doctrine."6
Courts frequently choose to pierce whenever it furthers a sufficient
public policy concern of the forum .7 Courts then justify the out-
come of the case based on the presence, or absence, of a number of
often substantively irrelevant facts.78 The enormous volume of
73. Barber, supra note 29, at 376 (quoting Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 47
Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957)). See also Dobbyn, A Practical Approach to Consis-
tency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 185, 187 (1971) (the rule's elements are: the
inequitable relationship between plaintiff and shareholder and the "instrumentality" rela-
tionship between the shareholder and corporation). Cf. Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Cor-
porate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1 (1978). The Krendls suggest that certain
"ultimate issues" concern courts in applying the applicable veil-piercing test. These ulti-
mate issues fall into three categories. The first category contains the preconditions which a
plaintiff must meet before she can make a veil-piercing case. "Such factors are: dominance
of ... a 'subservient corporation' by ... the 'dominant party'; a beneficial interest by the
dominant party in the subservient corporation; and an injury to the plaintiff reasonably
related to the defendant's dominance of the subservient corporation." Id. at 23. The second
category requires the showing of an improper purpose, and the final issue to be resolved
involves the balancing of policy considerations. Id. at 23-24.
74. See Note, supra note 63, at 340.
75. Dobbyn, supra note 73, at 189.
76. See Landers, supra note 36, at 620. Cf. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 73, at 6-7 (courts
apply a common set of "equitable principles" to various fact situations).
77. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 136, at 314 ("the policy of statutes applicable to
the [parent/subsidiary relationship]" is an "operative factor" in determining whether to
pierce).
78. See Landers, supra note 36, at 620 ("the typical veil piercing case is an exercise in
cataloging a number of factors in order to reach a normative conclusion that piercing is or is
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veil-piercing literature simply catalogues factual circumstances
that support piercing.79 Although legal scholars search for a sem-
blance of consistency between the cases, they are unable to estab-
lish a clear pattern to the factors justifying corporate veil-
piercing.e0
A significant part of the chaos surrounding veil-piercing results
from the indiscriminate application of veil-piercing theory to strik-
ingly different problems.8 1 Although different fact situations in-
volve varying policy considerations, "a common set of rules and
equitable principles are usually applied to all of them. '8 2 This ap-
proach to "regarding or disregarding the corporate entity tends to
cause different situations to be treated in the same manner."' 3
The failure of state courts to adhere to a single veil-piercing the-
ory also creates much confusion. For example, New York courts
apply both the agency theory 4 and the instrumentality rule. s5 No
basis for a court's choosing one test over another exists. In addi-
not appropriate"). An oft-cited opinion applying the instrumentality rule found the follow-
ing facts as significant:
(1) The parent corporation owns all or majority of the capital stock of the
subsidiary. (2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors
or officers. (3) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary. (4) The parent
corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise
causes its incorporation. (5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(6) The parent corporation pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the sub-
sidiary. (7) The subsidiary has subs.tantially no business except with the par-
ent corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corpora-
tion. (8) In the papers of the parent corporation, and in the statements of its
officers, the "subsidiary" is referred to as such or as a department or division.
(9) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in
the interest of the subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation.
(10) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and inde-
pendent corporation are not observed.
Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940). Of the factors listed in Fish, only facts (8)
and (10) are substantively irrelevant. See also Barber, supra note 29 at 374-75 (list of 19
factors, one or more of which was present in each case of veil-piercing).
79. Landers, supra note 36, at 619-20.
80. Dobbyn, supra note 73, at 189.
81. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, § 6.10, at 136; Latty, supra note 47, at 621-22.
82. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 73, at 7.
83. Latty, supra note 47, at 626.
84. E.g., Astrocom Elecs. v. Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 63 A.D.2d 765, 766, 404
N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (1978).
85. E.g., Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see Dob-
byn, supra note 73, at 186.
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tion, although New York courts generally apply one of the tests to
a given case, occasionally they apply the tests in the alternative."6
Because of such confusion, predicting which test a court will apply
in a particular case is impossible. The confusion plaguing the
courts in the application of corporate veil-piercing theory multi-
plies when corporation owners seek to pierce the corporate veil for
their own benefit.
III. THE REVERSE PIERCE
Courts generally have adopted three approaches to determine
whether corporation owners should be able to pierce the veil of
their corporation. The traditional and majority view is that a cor-
poration may not disregard its own separate entity for any rea-
son. 7 The other two approaches permit the reverse pierce under
the proper circumstances but differ as to the method of analysis.
The second approach entails an application of the traditional cor-
porate veil-piercing test in the jurisdiction."8 This view attributes
no weight to the fact that the corporation is the party seeking to
pierce. Under the third method, courts determine whether to
pierce the corporate veil after an analysis of the equitable and
public policy concerns at issue. Courts adhering to this "equity/
policy analysis" will pierce the corporate veil for the benefit of the
corporation owners if equity or public policy so requires.89
Corporation owners seek to disregard the separate entity of their
corporations under a variety of circumstances. Despite the court's
approach, its willingness to accept the reverse pierce often turns on
public policy considerations implicated in a given case. For exam-
ple, case law suggests that a bankruptcy court is generally amena-
ble to a reverse pierce to afford relief to a debtor;90 however, a
court is not likely to permit a reverse pierce when the corporation
owner seeks to avoid a regulation imposed to protect the public.91
86. See, e.g., Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., 549 F. Supp. 857, 858-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
87. See, e.g., Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1981).
88. See, e.g., Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., 500 So. 2d 759, 761-63 (La. 1987).
89. See, e.g., In re Western World Funding, 52 Bankr. 743, 781-83 (D. Nev. 1985).
90. E.g., id.
91. See Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1946) (per
curiam).
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As a result, one must be wary of the public policy concerns impli-
cated in a case when analyzing the court's approach. For ease of
analysis, this Note examines the case law according to the three
broad approaches adopted to address the reverse pierce.
A. Strict Adherence to the Separate Personality Doctrine
The traditional judicial response to the reverse pierce is an abso-
lute refusal to pierce the corporate veil in favor of those who cre-
ated it, the corporation owners. Courts base their refusal to reverse
pierce on a strict adherence to the separate personality doctrine
embodied in traditional corporate law. The "separate personality"
approach enjoys widespread support and is clearly the majority
view.
The primary characteristic of the separate personality approach
is an unwavering obedience to traditional corporate entity theory.
In other words, courts adhering to this approach consider a corpo-
ration and its owners to be separate legal entities for all purposes.
In Carey v. National Oil Corp.,e2 for example, an American parent
purchased oil through a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, which
then contracted with another foreign corporation to obtain the
oil. 3 The foreign supplier subsequently cancelled its agreement
with the foreign subsidiary, and the American parent sought dam-
ages for breach of contract.9 4 The parent claimed that the foreign
subsidiary was amenable to United States jurisdiction because the
breach "'cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.' ,,5 Con-
cluding that the breach only had a direct effect on the foreign sub-
92. 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
93. Id. at 675. The foreign oil company involved was the National Oil Corporation, which
was wholly owned by the Libyan government. The subsidiary was compelled to contract
with the National Oil Corporation after Libya nationalized several foreign-owned oil conces-
sions in September, 1973, forcing the subsidiary's previous supplier to terminate its con-
tract. Id.
94. Id. The National Oil Company cancelled its contracts due to the Libyan oil embargo
imposed on the United States, the Netherlands, and the Bahamas. World oil prices rose
dramatically as a result. The parent sought $1.6 billion in damages. Id.
95. Id. at 676. (quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(2)). The National Oil Corporation is a foreign state for the purposes of this Act and
is thus immune from United States jurisdiction with certain limited exceptions. Id. at 676 &
nn.1-2.
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sidiary, the court refused to "'pierce the corporate veil' in favor of
those who created that veil.""6
Courts call upon basic notions of judicial fairness to buttress
their strict adherence to traditional corporate entity doctrine. Es-
sentially, courts intimate that because the corporation owner is re-
sponsible for the corporate veil, allowing the corporation owner to
deny it would be "unfair." Courts articulate this underlying sense
of unfairness through two related means.
First, courts view the corporation owner as having made an af-
firmative and intelligent choice to operate her business in the cor-
porate form. According to this view, the corporation owner consid-
ered the respective advantages and disadvantages of the available
business structures before selecting the corporate organization as
the preferred mode of operation. As a result of this inquiry, the
corporation owner was aware that the law views a corporation and
its owners as separate entities. Because the corporation owner
chose the corporate form with knowledge of this fact, she cannot
now decry her separate legal existence.
T.V.A. v. Exxon Nuclear Co. reflected this view.97 In T.V.A., a
corporate parent sought the status of a third party beneficiary
under a contract entered into by a wholly-owned subsidiary.9 The
court refused to pierce the veil between the parent and the subsidi-
96. Id. at 676 (footnote omitted). The court held that the effect on the American parent
could "only be deemed indirect" through the parent's relations with the subsidiary. Id.
A court reached a similar result in O'Driscoll v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,486 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1983). A foreign national residing
in the United States owned a foreign corporation that purchased and held his personal in-
vestments. The court held that the foreign corporation was unable to bring fraud claims in a
federal forum because the losses were not the direct result of acts occurring within the
United States. The court reasoned that the corporation owner deliberately created the cor-
poration to hold the investments and must abide by that decision. Although refusing to
permit the foreign corporation to "pierce its own corporate veil," id. at 96,834 n.10, the
court did recognize that, because the corporation owner was the sole shareholder and chief
executive officer of the foreign corporation, "if [the corporation owner] was deceived, [the
corporation] was deceived." Id. at 96,835. Such realization is equivalent to an admission that
the corporation and the corporation owner share an identity of interests.
97. 570 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 464. The subsidiary entered into a supply contract to furnish uranium to the
plaintiff. The contract contained an upward price adjustment to cover increased costs of
supply. The parent sought increased costs under the price adjustment clause of the contract.
Id. at 463.
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ary, requiring that the two entities "abide by their choices" of bus-
iness organization."9
Many courts take the affirmative decision rationale one step fur-
ther. These courts focus on the motivation behind the corporation
owner's choice of the corporate structure. Courts view the corpora-
tion owner as choosing the most advantageous business structure
for the organization. The corporation owner should not be heard to
deny the existence of the corporation because it later proved disad-
vantageous in a particular circumstance.
This attitude pervades the opinion in Chemical Bank v. Howell-
Kessler Co.100 A partnership claimed equitable ownership of real
property held by a corporation owned by the partnership.' The
partnership asserted that "the corporation [was] an inactive shell
with merely nominal title."'1 2 The court ruled that "it would be
particularly inappropriate to permit [the partnership] to deny the
independent existence of the corporation" that they created to se-
cure the advantages of the corporate form. 0 3
Courts also justify their refusal to reverse pierce on a concern for
legal order. Many view the reverse pierce as an opportunity for
corporation owners to manipulate the legal status of their corpora-
tion to suit current needs.0 4 The United States Supreme Court ar-
ticulated this concern in Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United
99. Id. at 465. Accord Davidson v. General Motors, 119 Mich. App. 730, 326 N.W.2d 625
(1982) (per curiam); Williams v. American Title Ins., 83 Mich. App. 686, 269 N.W.2d 481
(1978).
100. 447 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
101. Id. at 977. The partnership filed for a real property arrangement under Chapter XII
of the Bankruptcy Act to avoid the sale of the property by the mortgagee. Any person, other
than a corporation, who was the legal or equitable owner of real property that was security
for a debt could apply for protection under Chapter XII. Id.
102. Id. Although not addressing the viability of the corporation expressly, the court
noted that "a respectable argument can be made that the corporation was not simply an
inactive shell. . . but did have an independent existence for some period after its forma-
tion." Id. at 978.
103. Id. at 977. The court noted the "tax advantage" expressly. Id. The court concluded
that "it would be inconsistent with the limited reach of the Bankruptcy Act to permit a
debtor to assume or renounce corporate status, and thus take advantage of Chapter XII,
depending on its needs of the moment." Id. at 978.
104. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, § 25.01; see, e.g., In re Beck Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d
410, 418 (2d Cir.),-cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); Bross Utils. Serv. Corp. v. Abombshait,
618 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Boswell v. May Centers, Inc., 669 S.W.2d 585, 586
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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States.105 In Schenley, a subsidiary sought to avoid the acquisition
of a transportation permit. The parent formed the subsidiary to
transport property for the parent and other affiliated corpora-
tions."0 6 The Interstate Commerce Act required any person trans-
porting property in interstate commerce for compensation to ob-
tain a permit.10 7 Any person transporting property in the course of
a commercial enterprise was exempt from the requirement. 08 The
subsidiary asserted that it did not require a permit because the
transportation would'be "in furtherance of one 'commercial enter-
prise.' ,,os The Supreme Court rejected tersely the subsidiary's
plea to disregard the separate entities:110 "One who has created a
corporate arrangement, chosen as a means of carrying out his busi-
ness purposes, does not have the choice of disregarding the corpo-
rate entity in order to avoid the obligations which the statute lays
upon it for the protection of the public." '
B. Traditional Corporate Veil-Piercing Theory
Interestingly, courts generally decline to apply traditional corpo-
rate veil-piercing theory in the context of a reverse pierce. Indeed,
traditional veil-piercing theory is probably the minority approach.
However, courts occasionally resort to some veil-piercing analysis
when addressing a reverse pierce.
In Crum v. Krol,"2 for example, a corporation owner claimed
amounts paid by his wholly-owned corporation as personal dam-
105. 326 U.S. 432 (1946) (per curiam).
106. Id. at 436. The subsidiary was to receive compensation from the parent and the affil-
iated corporations for performing the transportation services. Id.
107. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 203(a)(15)).
108. Id. at 434 (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C § 203(a)(17)).
109. Id. at 436.
110. The Court previously affirmed the dismissal of the parent from the suit for lack of
standing. The sole interest of the parent was that of a shareholder and its status was not
"altered by the mere facts that it owns all the stock of the corporation ... and that the
parent manages and controls its subsidiary." Id. at 435.
111. Id. at 437. Accord Sander v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 710 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986). The sole shareholder and an officer of a real estate corporation claimed to be
the alter ego of the corporation to avoid penalty under the state law governing real estate
brokers. The Court held that because the statute was "enacted to protect the public from
fraud and incompetence. . ., [the defendant] should not be permitted to strain statutory
construction to avoid regulation under the statutes." Id. at 899 (citation omitted).
112. 99 IMI. App. 3d 651, 425 N.E.2d 1081 (1981).
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ages. The trial court added the corporation as a party to the action
reasoning that the corporation was essentially the alter ego of the
owner.'1" The Appellate Court of Illinois applied a two-part test
used in typical corporate veil-piercing cases. 1 4 The court held that
the corporation owner satisfied the test and treated the owner and
his corporation as one entity for purposes of calculating
damages.-"
In In re Beck Industries,"6 the court also approached the re-
verse pierce as a corporate veil-piercing question. In Beck Indus-
tries, trustees of a bankrupt parent sought to enjoin a suit brought
against a subsidiary. Although not expressly applying any corpo-
rate veil-piercing test, the court considered a number of factors
typically deemed relevant in a traditional veil-piercing case." 7 On
examining these facts, the court determined that the subsidiary
was an independent and viable concern, separate from its par-
ent."18 After applying veil-piercing analysis, however, the court dis-
113. Id. at 659, 425 N.E.2d at 1087. The trial court joined the corporation, in part, be-
cause the defendant "had known of the corporation's existence from the beginning and was
not unfairly surprised or otherwise prejudiced by the joinder of the corporation." Id. The
appellate court determined that joinder of the corporation was unnecessary. The trial court
had determined that the corporation was an alter ego of the owner; therefore, the owner
remained the "real or sole party in interest" without the need for joinder. Id. at 660, 425
N.E.2d at 1088.
114. In Illinois, a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must meet two requirements:
"(1) '[T]here must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities
of the corporation and individual no longer exist'; and (2) 'circumstances must be such that
an adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or pro-
mote injustice.'" Id. at 661, 425 N.E.2d at 1088 (quoting Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, 91
Il. App. 3d 999, 1004, 415 N.E.2d 560, 563-64 (1980)). See generally supra notes 63-86 and
accompanying text (overview of veil-piercing law).
115. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 661, 425 N.E.2d at 1088. See also Messick v. PHD Trucking Srv.,
678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984) (plaintiff corporation owner unable to prove damages through
reverse pierce when corporation owner failed to satisfy two-prong test for piercing the cor-
porate veil).
116. 479 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).
117. The court examined such facts as: commingling of assets, adequacy of the subsidi-
ary's capital, source of the subsidiary's funds and business, and the maintenance of corpo-
rate formalities. Id. at 417. See generally authorities cited supra note 78 (factors present in
cases permitting piercing of the corporate veil).
118. 479 F.2d at 417. The subsidiary was perhaps as independent as a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary could be. The parent corporation acquired it recently, and the subsidiary continued
to operate in the same manner as it had prior to the acquisition. Id.
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missed the parent's bid to pierce the corporate veil, reasoning
tersely that the "parent cannot 'have it both ways.',119
C. Balancing of Equitable and Public Policy Concerns
Courts are often willing to pierce the corporate veil for the bene-
fit of the corporation owner when equity or public policy so re-
quires. The increasing acceptance of this approach apparently cor-
responds with the transformation of traditional veil-piercing
theory into an equitable doctrine. Like any equitable approach, the
equity/policy approach merely involves a balancing of the relevant
interests.
Significant public policy concerns usually are determinative
under this approach to the reverse pierce. For example, in Cargill,
Inc. v. Hedge,'120 a husband and wife transferred their interest in
their farm to a family farm corporation with the wife becoming
sole shareholder.'21 After obtaining a judgement against the hus-
band and the corporation, a creditor successfully bid on the prop-
erty at an execution sale.' 22 State law provided for a homestead
exemption that exempted "from seizure or sale '[t]he house owned
and occupied by the debtor as his dwelling place, together with the
land upon which it is situated.' ,,123 However, the court found that
this exemption did not apply to a corporation.' The Minnesota
Supreme Court avoided this prohibition by permitting the corpora-
tion owners to reverse pierce the corporate veil.'25 Most impor-
tantly, in Cargill, strong public policy concerns 126 overshadowed
119. Id. at 418.
120. 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985).
121. Id. at 478. All officers and directors were members of the family, but none received
any compensation in that capacity. Id. at 479.
122. Id. at 478.
123. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 510.01 (1984)).
124. Id. A corporation is not entitled to the homestead exemption because it is an artifi-
cial entity that requires no dwelling. Id.
125. Id. The court declined to adopt the "equitable interest" theory the court of appeals
advanced. Under the equitable interest theory, the court of appeals asserted that the wife's
occupancy and status as sole shareholder constituted a sufficient interest for the husband
and wife to assert the homestead exemption. Id.
126. Id. at 479. The homestead exemption is derived from the Minnesota Constitution.
Id. at 478 (citing MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12). The court cited various cases and statutes to
support the overwhelming Minnesota policy of protecting the debtor's home from his credi-
tors. Id. at 479.
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the absence of many factors important in a traditional veil-piercing
case.
127
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmatively adopted
the reverse pierce in Cargill, it did so with reservation. 28 The con-
cerns that the court expressed are not unique. Many courts apply-
ing the equity/policy approach to the reverse pierce find breaking
with traditional entity theory a difficult task.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed similar concern in
Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley. 2 ' In Barium, a corporation owner
entered into an agreement to purchase all of the stock of defend-
ants' corporation.130 The defendants breached the purchasing
agreement, injuring the corporation owner's subsidiary.13 The de-
fendants asserted that the corporation owner could not recover be-
cause it suffered no damages. The court made much of the estab-
lished corporate law principle of separate entity yet ultimately
held that it would treat a corporation and its shareholders as iden-
tical "'where ... justice to all parties requires it.' "132
Although many proponents of the equity/policy approach ex-
press reservations, courts following this approach generally seem
willing to depart from traditional entity theory. For example, In re
Western World Funding'33 marked a significant break from tradi-
127. Id. at 479. Interestingly, although the farm maintained corporate formalities and ac-
ted as a corporation in dealing with local agencies, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted
the trial court's finding that the family "operated the farm as their own." Id.
128. Id. at 480 ("a reverse pierce should be permitted in only the most carefully limited
circumstances").
129. 379 Pa. 38, 108 A.2d 336 (1954).
130. The court best described the complicated relationship among the participants in this
action: "Barium [the corporation owner] bought all of the stock of, and wholly owned
Equipment Company; Barium wholly owned Clyde Iron Works, Inc.; Clyde wholly owned
Wiley Manufacturing Company [the injured subsidiary], to whom it transferred all of the
assets of Equipment Company, having acquired them through [the defendant]." Id. at 47,
108 A.2d at 341.
131. Under the purchase agreement, defendants warranted that the transferred corpora-
tion owed no taxes. The state subsequently assessed tax deficiencies. The applicable statute
required the transferred corporation or the transferee of the corporation's assets to pay the
tax. As a result the subsidiary was the injured party. Id. at 41-43, 108 A.2d at 338-39.
132. Id. at 48, 108 A.2d at 341 (quoting Edirose Silk Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 338 Pa. 139, 143, 12 A.2d 40, 42 (1940)). See also Brown Bros. Equip. Co. v. State, 51
Mich. App. 448, -, 215 N.W.2d 591, 593 (1974) ("the fiction of separate corporate entity of
two corporations will not be extended where to do so would not serve the ends of justice").
133. 52 Bankr. 743 (D. Nev. 1985).
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tional entity theory. In Western World, the trustee of a debtor cor-
poration sought to hold the corporation owners personally liable
for the corporation's debts on an alter ego theory. 34 The corpora-
tion owners argued that the trustee's standing was equivalent to a
corporation piercing its own veil.13 5 The court responded by per-
mitting the trustee to "establish the identity of the alter egos with
the corporations in order to determine what are the assets of the
estate."'136 Significantly, the court continued:
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that a corporation would be
forbidden to pierce its own corporate veil in a non-bankruptcy
context. There is no inconsistency in allowing such an action.
The alter ego doctrine is an equitable remedy which may be in-
voked for some purposes and not others. It may be utilized when
equity requires, such as to protect innocent parties, rather than
as a defense to the liability of defaulting fiduciaries .... [No]
legal or logical difficulty [exists] in a corporation's bringing an
alter ego action in its own name.137
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE REVERSE
PIERCE
When presented with a reverse pierce, courts typically choose
one of the three approaches examined above. Unfortunately, all
three methods provide an inadequate basis for determining
whether to permit a reverse pierce. This Note next examines the
failings of these approaches.
A. Strict Adherence to the Separate Personality Doctrine
The oft-cited case of Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.138 is a typ-
ical example of the majority view and thus provides a good starting
134. Id. at 753. Under Nevada law, the elements of an alter ego action are: the corpora-
tion is controlled by an individual; such a unity of interest and ownership makes the two
inseparable; and enforcing the separate entity fiction would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice. Id. at 777 (citing Frank McCleary Cattle Co. v. Sewell, 73 Nev. 279, 282, 317 P.2d
957, 959 (1957)).
135. Id. at 784.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added). Accord Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 831 F.2d
1339 (7th Cir. 1987); In re S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987).
138. 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979).
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point for analysis. In Boggs, plaintiffs'3 9 brought an action against
a parent corporation for negligence and recklessness in maintain-
ing a coal mine.140 The parent argued that the parent and subsidi-
ary were an integrated business and thus were a single "employer"
subject to immunity under the state workers' compensation act.14 1
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that "principles of rec-
iprocity" forbade the parent from "avoid[ing] the consequences of
its corporate structure in order to claim immunity"' 42 from a com-
mon law action under the state's workers' compensation act.
43
The Boggs decision warrants sharp criticism.'4 The case con-
tains many of the factors critical to a court's determination
whether to pierce the corporate veil of an integrated economic en-
terprise. 45 The parent owned all of the subsidiary's stock; the sub-
sidiary sold all coal produced to the parent; the parent retained all
money received from sales of the coal; and the parent provided all
funds needed to pay the subsidiary's expenses. 46 Most signifi-
cantly, the parent had the "primary responsibility for 'mine safety
functions' at the [subsidiary's] mine.' 4 7 Although these factors
plainly support piercing the corporate veil, the court concluded
that the parent and the subsidiary were separate and distinct cor-
139. Boggs emerged from a tragic mine accident. An accumulation of methane gas re-
sulted in an explosion that killed 15 miners. The deceased miners were employees of a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant corporation. The plaintiffs were the 15 widows of
the miners killed in the accident. Id. at 657.
140. Id. at 658. Plaintiffs alleged that the parent recognized a need for improved ventila-
tion in the mine but negligently failed to take action. In addition, plaintiffs asserted that the
parent removed existing ventilation and safety devices to expand operations and then con-
cealed such removal from federal mine inspectors. Id.
141. Id. The parent argued alternatively that the subsidiary produced coal for the parent
under an agreement, and as a result, the parent was a contractor specifically immune from
liability under the act. Id.
142. Id. at 662.
143. Id.
144. See Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Workers' Compensation Cases, 35 U. FLA.
L. REv. 701, 713-15 (1983).
145. See generally supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (factors justifying piercing
the corporate veil by courts).
146. 590 F.2d at 657. The court's opinion incorporated a portion of the parent's brief
describing the relationship between the parent and subsidiary. Id.
147. Id. at 658.
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porations.145 Typical of the separate personality doctrine, Boggs is
a celebration of form over substance.
The basic theory underlying the separate personality approach is
simply that corporation owners should not be able to enjoy the
benefits of incorporated status while avoiding any drawbacks.149
According to this theory, permitting corporation owners to both
raise and lower the corporate shield would be manifestly unfair.
On the surface, this notion of reciprocity has a certain attractive
quality; it creates a constant world of black and white. This simple
world, however, has one serious drawback; it does not reflect real-
ity. Furthermore, not all legal writers conclude that the reverse
pierce violates some underlying rule of legal fairness.
In In re Oil Spill By the Amoco Cadiz,150 the court found no
unfairness in permitting a reverse pierce. A wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary of an American parent purchased an oil tanker from a
foreign shipbuilder. 51 The oil tanker broke up off the coast of
France, causing extensive damage to the shoreline. The American
parent sought indemnification or contribution from the foreign
shipbuilder for any judgement awarded against the parent. 52 In
addressing the foreign shipbuilder's challenge to the court's per-
sonal jurisdiction over the claim, Judge Posner wrote:
Although [the shipbuilder] makes much of [the subsidiary's]
place of incorporation, there do not appear to be any real Liberi-
ans in the picture-Liberian registry having been obtained no
doubt for the none too creditable purpose of avoiding liability,
rather than to conduct business in or from Liberia. The real
purchaser of the [oil tanker] was [the American parent], whose
headquarters is in [the United States]; and while for many pur-
148. Id. at 662-63.
149. See, e.g., T.V.A. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 570 F. Supp. 462, 465 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (tax
and regulatory advantages), affd, 753 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1985); Chemical Bank v. Howell-
Kessler Co., 447 F. Supp. 976, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (tax advantage); Williams v. American
Title Ins. Co., 83 Mich. App. 686, 269 N.W.2d 481 (1978) (business and tax advantages).
150. 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
151. A Spanish company built the ship and sold it to a Liberian subsidiary of the Ameri-
can parent. The American parent and Spanish shipbuilder handled all negotiations. The
parties signed the contract in the United States, listing the purchaser as a "yet-to-be-
formed" Liberian subsidiary. Id. at 914.
152. Id. at 912. The parent's cross-claim for indemnification or contribution did not in-
clude the Liberian subsidiary. Id. at 914.
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poses the decision to do business through a subsidiary has legal
consequences, we do not believe that [the parent's] decision to
create a Liberian subsidiary to hold title to the [oil tanker]
should affect our interpretation of the [state] long-arm
statute.1
53
The court concluded: "If the plaintiffs can pierce [the parent's]
corporate veil to get at [the parent] directly, we cannot see why
[the parent] should not be able to pierce its own veil and get at
[the shipbuilder]."154 In stark contrast to the adherents of the sep-
arate personality doctrine, Judge Posner viewed the reverse pierce
as a means of advancing fairness.
As Judge Posner noted in Amoco Cadiz, business persons often
choose to operate their enterprise as a corporation to gain the ben-
efit of limited liability. 15 5 Courts following the separate personality
doctrine often base their decisions on their respect for the revered
notion of limited liability.15  The role of limited liability, however,
receives unwarranted emphasis when applied to corporate groups.
Limited liability is rarely the sole motivation behind the corpora-
tion owner's choice of business structure. 157 Justice Douglas noted
that "the desire for limited liability has been merely one among
many factors' 118 behind a parent's decision to incorporate a por-
tion of its enterprise as a wholly-owned subsidiary. A parent often
chooses to incorporate a portion of its business as a subsidiary to
streamline management. 59 Certainly, a court should not penalize a
corporation owner for seeking to operate his business enterprise in
the most efficient manner.
153. Id. The court actually found that the American parent had created the foreign sub-
sidiary in an effort "to keep some of its assets out of the reach of potential creditors." Id.
154. Id. at 914-15.
155. See generally Posner, supra note 39, at 503 (Judge Posner's views on the importance
of limited liability).
156. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill, 699 F.2d at 914; In re Beck Industries, 479 F.2d 410, 417
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., 500 So. 2d 759,
763 (La. 1987); Boswell v. May Centers, Inc., 669 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
157. See generally note 35 and accompanying text (motives behind incorporating a busi-
ness). Certainly, instances exist when the corporation owner's desire to limit liability may be
his only concern when selecting a business structure. For example, a business entity that
transports and disposes of hazardous chemicals would do well to operate as a corporation.
158. Douglas & Shanks, supra note 35, at 193.
159. Id.
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Other commentators argue that traditional limited liability con-
cepts should not even apply to corporate groups. The purpose of
limited liability is to facilitate business investment by protecting
the investor, the shareholder. Judicial extension of limited liability
to the parent of a corporate group was not necessary to protect the
ultimate investor,' the shareholder of the parent corporation.
Limited liability of a corporate group, in fact, creates two layers of
protection.1"' Courts extended limited liability blindly without rec-
ognizing that the relationship between members of a unitary enter-
prise is remarkably different than the link between the ultimate
investor to the enterprise.8 2 As a result, the importance courts
place on limited liability between members of a corporate group is
misplaced.
Courts adhering to the separate personality approach stretch the
doctrine of artificial personality beyond its originally conceived
limits. The artificial personality theory was never intended to be
the unyielding concept it has become. Over fifty years ago, the
Michigan Supreme Court stated:
"The doctrine .. .that a corporation is a legal entity existing
separate and apart from the persons composing it is a mere fic-
tion, introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the
ends of justice. This fiction cannot be urged to an extent and
purpose not within its reason and policy, and it has been held
in an appropriate case, and in furtherance of the ends of justice,
a corporation and the individual or individuals owning all its
stock and assets will be treated as identical."' 3
In addition, Professor Berle noted:
[B]elow the corporation papers there is always an enterprise;
that, prima facie, the corporate papers, minute books and books
of account describe and indicate that enterprise; but that it is
always open to inquiry whether the enterprise-fact corresponds
to the corporate-fact. If it does not, the court may, on cause
160. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 7, § 3.02.1, at 60.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Montgomery v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust, 267 Mich. 142, 147-48, 255 N.W. 274,
276 (1934) (emphasis added) (quoting 7 RULING CASE LAW 27 (1929)).
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shown, insist upon dealing with the actuality of the enterprise-
fact.16
4
The courts' rigid adherence to the artificial personality doctrine,
the cornerstone of the separate personality approach, finds little
support in the history of the doctrine itself.
Further, this emphasis on the corporate form ignores an impor-
tant element in traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence: control.'65
A superficial examination of the corporate form is grossly inade-
quate for two reasons. First, the parent and subsidiary almost al-
ways maintain corporate formalities. 66 Second, this cursory review
ignores the reality of the modern corporation's authority
structure.
67
In a group of related corporations the locus of the decision-
making authority will be determined by the needs of the enter-
prise as a whole. Yet the courts often talk about the necessity
that subsidiary and affiliated corporations have a separate and
independent will, as if corporations themselves had some sort of
incorporeal existence apart from their owners. Even if a subsidi-
ary has its own management team, it would be naive to expect
the enterprise owners to remain silent if they disagree with the
subsidiary's policies; if heads roll, there is no doubt whose
heads they will be.'68
Again, the courts' refusal to look beneath the surface of the corpo-
rate form blatantly exalts form over substance.
The separate personality approach places excessive emphasis on
the importance of limited liability in situations in which the con-
cept does not belong. Courts assume that corporation owners will
incorporate solely to avoid liability; however, that simply is not the
case. Proponents of this approach fail to recognize the economic
and functional realities of the marketplace. In short, the separate
personality approach simply exalts form over substance.
164. Berle, supra note 53, at 354 (emphasis added).
165. Barber, supra note 29, at 398.
166. Id.
167. See Note, supra note 63, at 340.
168. Landers, supra note 36, at 592 (emphasis added); see H. BALLANTINE, supra note 11,
at 308; Note, Suits in a Parent Corporation to Redress Injuries to the Subsidiary, 64 HARv.
L. REV. 1313, 1317 (1951).
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B. Traditional Veil-Piercing Theory
Application of traditional veil-piercing theory to a reverse pierce
case warrants both praise and criticism. The decision merits praise
because it represents a step in the right direction: a refusal to sanc-
tion outdated concepts of absolute separate entity. The traditional
veil-piercing approach recognizes that conventional corporate law
theories are ill-suited to the modern corporation. Courts following
this approach appreciate that permitting corporation owners to
pierce the corporate veil results in no manifest unfairness.
The application of the corporate veil-piercing doctrine in reverse
is, however, subject to the same criticism as traditional veil-pierc-
ing theory." 9 Essentially void of definite standards, corporate
planners are unable to predict accurately when courts will use the
veil-piercing doctrine. Lack of consensus in the area results in sub-
stantial confusion. Furthermore, courts often examine factors irrel-
evant to the reality of the situation. Whether a subsidiary is listed
as a division on the parent's stationery should have no bearing on
whether to pierce the veil between the two entities. Because of the
substantial deficiencies in traditional veil-piercing theory, applica-
tion of the veil-piercing doctrine to a reverse pierce is particularly
inappropriate.
C. Balancing of Equitable and Public Policy Concerns
The equity/policy theory also has advantages and disadvantages.
Illustrative of the courts' retreat from an absolute refusal to pierce
the veil for the benefit of the corporation owner, the equity/policy
approach to the reverse pierce embodies two significant concepts.
It represents both an increasingly flexible approach to the concept
of separate corporate entity and an appreciation of the role of eq-
uity and public policy in a reverse pierce.
Yet, the equity/policy theory is subject to many of the same crit-
icisms as the traditional veil-piercing doctrine. Like any balancing
doctrine, an equity/policy reverse pierce theory is inherently
standardless. Based on notions of justice and equity, such a theory
does not provide standards critical to corporate planners in deter-
169. See generally notes 63-86 and accompanying text (discussion of traditional veil-
piercing theory).
1989] 695
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:667
mining the status of the corporate structure. Further, courts apply-
ing this approach need not examine the relationship between the
parent and the subsidiary. Again, a more doctrinally sound and
predictable approach is needed.
V. A PROPOSAL
A. The Unitary Interest Test
Due to the deficiencies in the three accepted approaches to the
reverse pierce, a more comprehensive analysis is necessary. This
test must look beneath the surface of corporate formalities and ex-
amine the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. Yet,
the test must also remain sensitive to equitable and public policy
concerns.
The Supreme Court of Michigan took a significant step toward
developing such a test in Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.'
In Wells, an injured employee of a wholly-owned subsidiary17 '
brought a third-party products liability action against the par-
ent.'7 2 The parent asserted statutory immunity as the "real" em-
ployer of the subsidiary's employee. In establishing whether the
170. 421 Mich. 641, 364 N.W.2d 670 (1984). A court developed a similar test in Latham v.
Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). In Latham, the court ruled that a par-
ent could enjoy statutory immunity as employer of the subsidiary's employee "if the two
... concerns were so completely integrated and commingled that neither party could be
realistically viewed as a separate economic entity." Id. at 1037. Recently, the same court
addressed the identical issue again and declined "to adopt a per se rule that any parent
corporation automatically would share in its subsidiary's statutory immunity as an em-
ployer." Gaines v. Excel Indus., 667 F. Supp. 569, 575 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (footnote omitted).
171. In addition to the parent owning all the capital stock of the subsidiary, the two
maintained a close relationship. The parent handled all accounting; all money was deposited
in a bank account bearing the parent's name; the parent charged the subsidiary a certain
percentage for workers' compensation insurance; employees of the subsidiary were all under
the supervision of the parent and abided by the parent's rules and regulations; employees of
the subsidiary received paychecks from the parent; and the parent maintained all employ-
ment records of the subsidiary's employees. 421 Mich. at 648-50, 364 N.W.2d at 673-74
(quoting Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 97 Mich. App. 790, 794-96, 296 N.W.2d 174, 176-
77 (1980)).
172. Id. at 645-46, 364 N.W.2d at 672. The employee had previously sought and received
workers' compensation benefits listing the parent as his employer. Id. at 645, 364 N.W.2d at
672.
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parent was entitled to statutory immunity, the court applied the
"economic reality test. ' 173
The court defined the economic reality test as "'a broad ap-
proach which . . . looks to the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the performed work.' "174 The economic reality test ex-
amines such factors as: "(1) control of the worker's duties, (2)
payment of wages, (3) hiring, firing, and responsibility for the
maintenance of discipline, and (4) performance of the duties as an
integral part of the employer's business toward the accomplish-
ment of a common goal."' 7 Although tailored to the workers' com-
pensation arena, these factors share a unifying theme: a concern
for identifying the true locus of control in the enterprise. As the
court recognized, the economic reality test results in "a 'reverse-
piercing' of [the parent's] corporate veil.' 1 6
The court based its readiness to accept the reverse pierce on a
flexible definition of the corporate entity. The court viewed the fic-
tion of a corporation's separate personality as a "convenience in-
troduced in the law to subserve the ends of justice [which] ... will
be respected, unless doing so would subvert justice or cause a re-
sult that would be contrary to some other clearly overriding public
policy.' 77 In light of the public policy supporting the workers'
compensation statute and other equitable considerations, the court
disregarded the separate corporate entities of the parent and the
subsidiary. 7 8
The Supreme Court of Michigan's opinion in Wells embodies
many of the desired elements of an acceptable approach to the re-
verse pierce. The court focused on the enterprise's true locus of
control, considered equitable and public policy concerns, and
based its approach on a flexible definition of the corporate entity.
The court failed, however, to weave these elements into a single,
concise framework of analysis for a reverse pierce. The "unitary
173. Id. at 648-50, 364 N.W.2d at 673-74.
174. Id. at 648, 364 N.W.2d at 673 (quoting Farrell v. Dearborn Mfg. Co., 416 Mich. 267,
276, 330 N.W.2d 397, 400 (1982)).
175. Parkkonen v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 153 Mich. App. 204, -, 395 N.W.2d 289, 291
(1986) (per curiam).
176. Wells, 421 Mich. at 650, 364 N.W.2d at 674.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 651, 364 N.W.2d at 674.
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interest" test, a variation of the economic reality test espoused
most prominently in Wells, accomplishes this task.
The unitary interest test requires a court to make a two-step in-
quiry before it may reverse pierce the corporate veil. A court must
first determine whether the interests of the corporation and its
owners are so completely merged that neither concern could realis-
tically be considered a separate economic entity. Factors relevant
to making such a determination include:
extensive reciprocal dealing either in goods or services or in fi-
nancing or promotion, . . . an independent management struc-
ture [,] and an absence of direction from the owners of the en-
terprise. In the case of a newly acquired company, the factual
showing would probably involve a comparison of pre-acquisition
and post-acquisition levels of inter-corporate activity, and in the
case of developed subsidiaries, industry comparisons would be
appropriate. 17 9
Second, if the corporation and its owner share such a unitary
interest, the court then must examine relevant public policy and
equitable considerations and determine whether such concerns
weigh for, or against, permitting a reverse pierce.180 A court need
only reach the second step of the inquiry if it finds that the corpo-
ration and its shareholder(s) are an integrated economic enterprise
under step one.
B. The Unitary Interest Test Applied
Application of the unitary interest test to varying fact patterns
is helpful.
Example 1: Lemon Motor Cars, Inc. ("LMC") manufactures
automobiles. As part of its sales and distribution effort, LMC owns
a number of dealerships in key metropolitan areas. One such deal-
ership is Colonial Lemon of Williamsburg. LMC owns one hundred
179. Landers, supra note 34, at 539-40. This list is not exclusive. See Fish v. East, 114
F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (factors (1)-(7) and (9)).
180. Difficulty arises, of course, when an examination of equitable and policy concerns
yields a neutral result; neither public policy nor equity weighs in favor or against a decision
to reverse pierce. In such a case, the court should reverse pierce because the true focus of
the unitary interest test is on step one, whether the corporation owner and the corporation
are an integrated economic group.
[Vol. 30:667
REVERSE PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
percent of Colonial Lemon's stock, and Colonial Lemon distributes
all of its annual profits to LMC. The president and operating man-
ager of Colonial Lemon serve at the will of LMC. Furthermore,
LMC executives make all major Colonial Lemon spending deci-
sions, and LMC dictates the models and quantities of automobiles
sold in Colonial's showroom.
A state statute requires that car dealers disclose all defects in
"new" cars that delayed their production.:"" The statute expressly
exempts manufacturers from this duty.182 Colonial failed to notify
a customer of major repairs done to a car's steering mechanism at
LMC's plant. Upon the later failure of the car's steering mecha-
nism, the customer discovers that LMC reconditioned the steering
mechanism at the manufacturing plant.
The customer sues Colonial for violating the disclosure statute.
Colonial defends on the ground that it is entitled to the manufac-
turer's statutory exemption from the notice provision because it is
part of LMC's larger economic enterprise; thus, Colonial seeks to
reverse pierce the corporate veil.
The LMC/Colonial Lemon relationship is sufficiently interre-
lated to meet the first prong of the unitary interest test. LMC and
Colonial engage in extensive reciprocal dealing. Colonial is entirely
dependent on LMC for its supply of automobiles. In addition, Co-
lonial's manager is directly responsible to LMC, and LMC officials
make all of Colonial's major operational decisions. LMC owns all
of Colonial's stock and the two are truly an integrated economic
enterprise.
Although Colonial satisfies the first prong of the unitary interest
test, it fails to meet the second prong of the test. The disclosure
statute clearly expresses a legislative intent to protect consumers
by providing complete information of a new car's manufacturing
history. Permitting a reverse pierce in this instance would frustrate
this public policy. As a result, Colonial fails to meet the require-
ments of the unitary interest test's second step and cannot claim
181. This hypothetical statute requires disclosure of all major repairs to new cars. The
statute does not apply to "used" cars, cars previously owned by someone other than the
manufacturer. The statute would cover, for instance, the overhauling of a car's transmission
that was found to be defective during inspection following assembly.
182. The statute exempts automobile manufacturers because they do not deal with the
public directly.
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the manufacturer's exemption by reverse piercing the corporate
veil between LMC and Colonial.
Example 2: To promote oil production and boost the state's
economy, an economically depressed, southwestern state enacts a
statute prohibiting the award of punitive damages against any
company engaged in the production of oil. The protection extends
only to companies that own or lease oil rights within the state and
to incidents connected directly to the exploitation of those rights.
Absent this statue, state law permits punitive damages when the
defendant is reckless.
Marshall Oil Corporation enters the state to drill for oil under
several recently acquired oil leases. Marshall utilizes the services of
its wholly-owned subsidiary, Wythe Oil Rigs, Inc., to assemble and
operate the oil rigs. Over eighty percent of Wythe's revenues result
from services performed for Marshall. Further, Wythe only oper-
ates in markets in which Marshall has a significant presence.
Wythe's president and chief executive officer is a former vice presi-
dent of Marshall who continues to sit on Marshall's board. In addi-
tion, several key Wythe executives are former Marshall employees
who transferred to Wythe. Sixty percent of Wythe's directors are
current or former Marshall executives.
Due to a Wythe employee's reckless installation of a safety de-
vice, an oil rig explodes. The resulting fire causes extensive damage
to nearby property. The injured property owners sue Wythe, seek-
ing both compensatory and punitive damages. Wythe petitions the
court to rule as a matter of law that Wythe is entitled to the statu-
tory protection against punitive damages afforded its parent corpo-
ration, Marshall. 183
The Marshall/Wythe relationship is clearly sufficient to pass the
first prong of the unitary interest test. Their relationship includes
extensive reciprocal dealing; services performed for Marshall re-
present more than eighty percent of Wythe's revenue. The pres-
ence of current and former Marshall executives in the executive
ranks of Wythe and on Wythe's board of directors also impugns
the independence of Wythe's management structure. Finally, Mar-
shall dictates what markets that Wythe may enter.
183. The statute's protection does not facially cover Wythe because it neither owns nor
leases oil rights within the state.
[Vol. 30:667700
REVERSE PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Unlike example one, Wythe also passes the second step of the
unitary interest test. The statute involved in this scenario supports
extending the ban on punitive damages to this action against
Wythe. The statute expresses a legislative decision to encourage
investment in oil production by eliminating the risk of crippling
punitive damage awards against oil producers. Although the word-
ing of the statute apparently excludes Wythe from protection, the
policy embodied in the statute encourages shielding Wythe from
punitive damage liability. Wythe was actively engaged in the fur-
therance of Marshall's extended economic enterprise. Marshall is,
then, the real party in interest and deserves protection.
Example 3: Assume the same facts as example two, except that
McOil Corporation, an entirely unrelated corporation, engaged
Wythe's services. The Marshall/Wythe relationship in this example
is identical to example two. As a result, Wythe again passes the
first step of the unitary interest test.
In this example, however, Wythe fails to meet the second step of
the test. Protecting Wythe from punitive damages in this case
would not further the statutory intent because Marshall's invest-
ment in oil rights is not at risk. Insulating Wythe from punitive
damage liability would have no effect on Marshall's investment in
the state. Because the exculpatory statute is not applicable in this
instance, the court must look to the policy in the state law allowing
punitive damages: deterrence of reckless conduct. An award of pu-
nitive damages in this case would deter reckless behavior and thus
serve the purpose of the law permitting such damages. As a result,
the court should not reverse pierce and should hold Wythe liable
for punitive damages.
Example 4: Assume the same facts as example two, except that
Marshall only recently acquired eighty-five percent of Wythe's
stock from Tucker, who holds the remaining fifteen percent. As
part of the deal, Tucker remains as Wythe's president and chair-
man of the board, and the majority of pre-acquisition management
retain their positions. Marshall, however, replaced over fifty per-
cent of Wythe's board of directors with Marshall executives.
Wythe receives over fifty percent of its revenue from sources other
than Marshall and markets it services in areas where Marshall
does no business. The pre- and post-acquisition business dealing
between Marshall and Wythe increased by five percent.
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In this example, the Marshall/Wythe relationship does not sur-
vive scrutiny under the first step of the unitary interest test. Al-
though Marshall and Wythe have extensive reciprocal dealings,
Wythe receives the majority of its revenue from outside sources. In
addition, Wythe maintains a relatively independent management
structure, free to pursue opportunities unconnected to Marshall.
Although Wythe receives some direction from Marshall through
the presence of Marshall executives on Wythe's board of directors,
this fact alone is not sufficient to show an integrated economic en-
terprise. Finally, the pre- and post-acquisition levels on intercorpo-
rate activity are fairly constant. The court should hold that Mar-
shall and Wythe are separate economic entities and that, as a
result, Wythe is amenable to punitive damages. (The court need
not reach the second step of the unitary interest test due to its
disposition of the first step).
C. Impact on Corporate Entity Theory
For several reasons, the unitary interest test is the superior ap-
proach to the reverse pierce. First, the unitary interest test recog-
nizes the nature of the modern corporate enterprise. The test is
sensitive to the economic realities of the contemporary market-
place. Second, the test examines the substance of the relationship
between the corporation and its owner more stringently than the
form of that relationship. It emphasizes the item most crucial in
determining whether a corporation is the alter-ego of its owners:
control. Third, the test applies equally well to cases involving a
close corporation or a corporate group. Also, the unitary interest
test reflects the prominent role of public policy considerations in
deciding to reverse pierce.18 4 Finally, the unitary interest theory
also provides for a better distribution of the costs and benefits an
integrated enterprise generates.
Undoubtedly, courts and commentators share a great fear that
pandemonium will result from widespread judicial acceptance of
the reverse pierce. The overwhelming reluctance to disregard the
184. "Analysis [of whether a corporation is a separate entity] should not be directed to
the nature of the corporateness but to the substantive policies underlying the issues." Ham-
ilton, supra note 62, at 1009. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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separate corporate entity for the benefit of the corporation owners
concretely manifests this sentiment. This reluctance is unwar-
ranted for three reasons.
The idea that the separate entity of corporations may be
respected for certain purposes and later disregarded for others en-
joys wide support. 8 " Additionally, the unitary interest approach
follows the traditional concept that under usual circumstances a
court must respect the separate entity of a corporation.'86 Corpora-
tion owners must overcome the court's customary reluctance to
pierce the corporate veil indiscriminately. The significance of this
barrier increases when one considers the factual showing required
under the first step of the unitary interest test. The unitary inter-
est test demands nearly complete identity between the entity and
the corporation owners; in reality the owner and the corporation
are one economic unit. Such a relationship is difficult to prove.
Finally, the vast majority of corporation owners will maintain
the separate existence of their corporations diligently to limit their
liability. Corporation owners must decide whether to integrate
their businesses or keep them separate. 8 7 Maintaining a relation-
ship between the owner and the corporation that is amenable to a
reverse pierce carries with it the significant possibility that third
parties will themselves pierce the corporate veil. Corporation own-
ers clearly desire to avoid such a result. As such, the benefits of the
reverse pierce will accrue to a limited number of corporation
owners.
CONCLUSION
In 1926, John Dewey wrote:
[O]ld non-legal doctrines which once served to advance rules of
law may be obstructive today. We often go on discussing
problems in terms of old ideas when the solution of the problem
depends upon getting rid of the old ideas, and putting in their
185. Many commentators recognize that a corporation may be treated as a separate entity
for some purposes and not for others. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
186. Ballantine, supra note 65, at 17.
187. See Berle, supra note 53, at 357; Davis, Workmen's Compensation-Using an En-
terprise Theory of Employment to Determine Who Is a Third Party Tortfeasor, 32 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 289, 301 (1951).
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place concepts more in accord with the present state of ideas
and knowledge. 88
This advice applies with particular force to the reverse pierce of
the corporate veil.
Courts must permit corporation owners to pierce the veil of their
corporation for their own benefit under appropriate circumstances.
The current refusal to permit a reverse pierce is based on archaic
notions of corporate entity and a longstanding distrust of corpora-
tions. Traditional corporate entity theory does not contemplate the
modern corporation. The economic reality of the modern market-
place demonstrates that the interests of the corporation owners
and their corporations often merge. The unitary interest test en-
ables a court to determine whether such integration exists and per-
mits the court to pierce the corporate veil for the benefit of the
corporation owner. The test focuses the court's attention on the
economic reality of the relationship between the corporation and
the owner and any relevant public policy concerns. Courts must
cease exalting form over substance and understand that the con-
cept of absolute separate entity no longer mirrors reality.
Michael J. Gaertner
188. Dewey, supra note 47, at 657. Professor Morton Horwitz labels Dewey's article "the
last great analysis" of corporate personality theory. Horwitz, supra note 46, at 175.
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